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Abstract
At present spoofing attacks via which biometric system
is potentially vulnerable against a fake biometric charac-
teristic, introduces a great challenge to recognition per-
formance. Despite the availability of a broad range of
presentation attack detection (PAD) or liveness detection
algorithms, fingerprint sensors are vulnerable to spoofing
via fake fingers. In such situations, finger dorsal images
can be thought of as an alternative which can be cap-
tured without much user cooperation and are more appro-
priate for outdoor security applications. In this paper, we
present a first feasibility study of spoofing attack scenarios
on finger dorsal authentication system, which include four
types of presentation attacks such as printed paper, wrapped
printed paper, scan and mobile. This study also presents a
CNN based spoofing attack detection method which employ
state-of-the-art deep learning techniques along with trans-
fer learning mechanism. We have collected 196 finger dor-
sal real images from 33 subjects, captured with a Lytro cam-
era and also created a set of 784 finger dorsal spoofing im-
ages. Extensive experimental results have been performed
that demonstrates the superiority of the proposed approach
for various spoofing attacks.
1. Introduction
With the increased deployment of biometric based au-
thentication systems in applications like smart-phones,
tablets and wearable mobile devices vulnerability of bio-
metric based devices to the presentation attacks is increas-
ing day-by-day [18]. The sole aim of various presentation
attack detection algorithms is to thwart the biometric sys-
tem in order to get an unauthorized access by some attacker
[11]. When a fabricated material is used to create a spurious
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biometric modality, it is more commonly known as spoof-
ing attack [2]. This kind of attack is common in fingerprints
or other modalities. Fingerprint spoofs are generated using
variety of materials like Ecoflex, Playdoh, Latex and many
more [5]. Spoofed materials generated using different ma-
terials have different characteristics and it has been shown
that methods present in literature are not generalizable to
unseen spoof materials on which they are not trained. The
existing spoof detection methods can be grouped into two
main categories (i) hardware based solutions (ii) software
based solutions. The hardware based solutions typically de-
tect physical characteristics like flow of the blood whereas
software based solutions typically extract physiological and
anatomical features from any biometric trait [15], thus these
software based solutions are much cheaper as they require
no-additional hardware cost in order to distinguish between
the live and spoof one. Popular face [18] and iris [8] bio-
metric artifacts are printed photo, 3D face masks, wrapped
printed attack, electronic display of an iris or facial photo
[16] as shown in Figure1. No matter what kind of presenta-
tion attack it is but it can easily jeopardized the security of
any biometric based recognition system. Hence, it is impor-
tant to elude such attacks.
1.1. Problem statement and motivation
In our work, we are mainly focusing on presentation at-
tack detection for finger dorsal images, which consist of
unique line shape patterns on the finger knuckle regions
Figure 1: Sample images illustrating various artifacts. (a)
wrapped image, (b) video playback, (c) life-size 3-D mask,
(d) paper cut mask (all these images are taken from [26], (e)
scanned image (c) captured image (images taken from [8])
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[11]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first at-
tempt in which we present a new prospective for finger
dorsal presentation attack detection, collected by light field
camera and deep learning mechanism. We have exam-
ined the complete finger dorsal structure which is coined as
finger knuckle image [10] in the literature just as a novel
case study, majorly because its anti-spoofing capabilities
are not studied at all. However, we have experimentally
observed, that the proposed technique is equally applica-
ble to other biometric traits like iris, face or fingerprints.
Although, smart-phones and tablets are commonly used in
today’s technocrat world and they can be easily authenti-
cated biometrically using finger dorsal images in the same
manner as the fingerprints are used. Moreover prolonged
use of Capecitabine [6] a drug used for cancer treatment
can also remove the fingerprints permanently as a side ef-
fect. In such situations finger-dorsal images can be seen as
a suitable alternative to fingerprint images. One can easily
used finger dorsal images for surveillance applications also
because it can be captured easily through distance unlike
fingerprints. We have taken finger dorsal images just for
the case study purpose although the proposed technique can
be employed to the other biometric modalities as well. We
have used state-of-the-art deep-learning techniques along
with a Lytro[1] camera for detecting the presentation at-
tack. Here the use of the Lytro camera is limited for training
our network only, in testing scenario we donot require lytro
camera.
FDSNet- Basic architecture detail : A basic model of
our proposed FDSNet (Finger dorsal spoof detection net-
work) is illustrated in Figure 2. It also depicts the images of
presentation attacks that we have considered for finger dor-
sal images. The two major components of this network are
depth extraction network and classification network. More
details about these networks are given in the subsequent sec-
tions in this paper. It is clearly evident from Figure 2 that
the depth map generated corresponding to different kinds of
attacks differs quite a lot which depicts great learn-ability of
our proposed depth extraction network and which is neces-
sary for true classification. Here different colors in depth-
map indicates the distance of the surface of the image from
different viewpoint. Larger the variation in the dark and
the light colors in the depth-map more depth information
it contains (as the depth-map of real-image is more infor-
mative in Figure 2 as compared to the depth-map of other
spoofed images).
Presentation attacks considered in this paper : The
major presentation attacks that we discussed in this paper
are as follows:
• Printed image attack: In this kind of attack, images
taken from Lytro-camera are printed on A4 size paper
using Canon imageClass MF229DW printer.
• Wrapped printed image attack: A printed image is
wrapped around object having somewhat curvature
similar to human hand. This results in different depth
information in comparison to a normal printed image.
But, it is more challenging to detect this kind of spoof-
ing attack due to depth presence.
• Scanned image attack: A printed image is scanned us-
ing a Canon imageClass MF229DW machine to create
this attack. It means input to scanner are printouts of
these images.
• Mobile image attack: A 2D genuine finger dorsal im-
age is rendered and displayed using Mi-A1 telephoto-
lens.
1.2. Light field camera and its usefulness
Depth as a feature is used for differentiating between
a real and a fake finger dorsal image. For extracting the
depth feature from the finger dorsal images we have used
Lytro-camera[1]. It is the first consumer light field camera.
Lytro Inc. software is used to import the light field from
the camera into the computer in the form of Light Field Pic-
ture (LFP) file. This LFP file is a 5D array and its size is
9 ∗ 9 ∗ 380 ∗ 380 ∗ 4 where 9 is the angular resolution, 380
is the spatial resolution while 4 is the RGB color channel
and the confidence associated with each pixel value. It is
very difficult to directly analyze or visualize this 5D file.
Open source Light Field Toolbox [7] for MATLAB is used
for projecting this 5D light field onto the 2D image. In a
conventional camera, the image is formed by summing all
the light rays received by each pixel whereas the light field
camera can capture the direction of the incident light rays
which enables it for surface depth reconstruction as well
as for image refocusing. A light-field camera consist of a
microlens array, which is embedded in front of the photo
sensor that enables it to save the directions of the incident
rays.
Usefulness for biometric traits: Most of the existing
studies in the field of biometrics using Lytro camera has
been done on detecting spoofed face or fingerprint images
mainly because of the large depth variation [17]. However,
finger dorsal image which comprises of convex shaped line
patterns at knuckle regions [10] and don’t have much varia-
tion in the depth. As a result, it becomes a quite challenging
problem to detect real one from a fake finger dorsal image
based on depth features. As far as the presented work is
concerned, we have analyzed raw light field photographs
for detecting spoofed finger knuckle images. Here, each
photograph is composed of combinations of several images
called microlens images. Different light distributions are
represented by microlens images depending upon the loca-
tion of the focal plane and thus it helps in estimating the
presence of depth in an image. The real difference between
Figure 2: FDSNet: Finger dorsal spoof detection network overall architecture
an original finger dorsal and fake finger dorsal image can be
depicted easily by the depth information.
1.3. Major contributions
The major contribution of this paper is three fold which
are summarized as follows:
• An indigenous in-house dataset for finger dorsal im-
ages is being collected using Lytro-camera. This
dataset consists of 196 real images and 784 spoof im-
ages corresponding to 33 subjects.
• Transfer learning paradigm is used to train a U-Net
based autoencoder architecture for generating depth-
map corresponding to input finger-dorsal image.
• A deep convolutional neural network architecture is
used that is capable of differentiating between the
depth map of a real and fake finger-dorsal image.
2. Related work and important findings
Light field camera originates from the concept of plenop-
tical function and has come into the spotlight, especially
with the emergence of camera technology and ongoing re-
search in the field of image processing [9]. In early 16th
century, the idea of light-field imaging was proposed when
its strength for acquisition of a photograph was evaluated
[9]. Thereafter, a continuous growth in this field has been
observed in terms of sensor technology as well as its us-
ages in different applications [27]. For example, the use
of Kinect camera to extract image information, and near-
infrared acquisition system to recognize the image under
various illumination at a distance were studied quite exten-
sively for biometrics applications [15]. In addition, thermal
and near infrared sensors are some representative examples
to develop anti-spoofing capabilities [18]. They can solve
the vulnerability, but they do not have merits in terms of
cost and commercialization [13]. In order to overcome the
Methods Novelty Techniques used Type of spoof Sensor
Raghavendra et
al. [15]
Introduced a new face artifact
database and extracted depth infor-
mation
LBP, Hamming dis-
tance
Photo print, electronic
screen
Lytro
Moghaddam et
al. [23]
Presented a review and benchmark-
ing study on light field based PAD
solutions
Histogram of Dis-
parity Gradients
Presentation attack NA
Moghaddam et
al. [21]
Introduced a Lenslet Light Field
Face Spoofing Database
Light field angular
LBP, SVM
Printed, wrapped, lap-
top, tablet and mobile
Lytro IL-
LUM
Kim et al. [13] Presented a liveness detection ap-
proach based on extraction of edge
and ray difference features
Sobel operator,
PCA, LBP, SVM
Print and tablet Lytro
Table 1: Comparative study of existing light field camera based spoof detection
limitations of such conventional cameras, light field camera
has been applied in various research fields. For example,
Lytro, and Raytrix are the most commercialized variants of
this technology [13]. However, light field cameras demand
serious computing power, expensive price, and larger size
which limit its usability in biometric applications up to cer-
tain extent. In spite of these challenges, a light field sensor
can provide useful information in terms of multiple depth
images in a single capture, holding additional information
that is quite useful for biometric applications. In [18], the
various characteristics of the camera devices, like light field
camera were discussed which used to capture the face im-
age for hardware based PAD approaches. Likewise in [2],
authors discussed the vulnerability in palm print recognition
systems and presented a PAD approach to discriminate the
real and fake biometric samples. In [13], a light field cam-
era based approach for defending spoofing face attacks, like
printed 2D facial images was demonstrated, which achieved
94.78% accuracy over different spoofing attacks. In [17],
authors worked on a problem of multiple face detection at
varying distances for which they prepared a multi focus face
dataset using light field camera. In [28], an efficient auto-
refocusing iris imaging solution for light field cameras is
proposed that selected the best focused image from multiple
focus images. In [16], authors investigated the additional
feature information that could be extracted from depth im-
ages like face and iris using super resolution mechanism,
collected by light field camera. In [22], authors put efforts
to develop light field camera (Lytro ILLUM lenslet) based
ear database i.e., Lenslet, consisted of 536 depth images
collected from 67 subjects. In [23], authors presented a re-
view and benchmarking analysis in the literature on light
field based face presentation attack detection solutions. In
[12], a 2D fake pedestrian recognition method was proposed
for which a pedestrian dataset using light field camera was
constructed, consisted of 1000 samples. In [3], authors pre-
sented a multi-task CNN approach that performed iris de-
tection and iris presentation attack detection efficiently. A
few important state-of-art studies are depicted in Table 1.
3. Proposed FDSNet: Methodology
In the proposed work we have taken finger-dorsal images
just for the case study purpose although it is equally applica-
ble to other biometrics having depth information like face or
ear. The obvious differentiating factor between a real and a
fake finger-dorsal image is the depth feature. In order to use
depth as a distinguishing factor we have collected our own
dataset of finger-dorsal images using Lytro-camera. The ex-
pensive cost of the light field camera makes it difficult to use
it in many applications. Here in our case, also we have used
it only for capturing the depth information which is nec-
essary while training the network and not required during
testing. Our proposed architecture consists of two subparts
(i) depth extraction network (ii) deep classification network.
3.1. Depth feature extraction network
For extracting the depth feature of our finger dorsal im-
ages we have used an architecture inspired from U-Net[19]
architecture. It is a kind of autoencoder with the presence
of skip connections in it. Autoencoders are widely used in
the literature for many applications like data compression,
image-denoising and so on. One of the major advantage
of autoencoders is that they can be used for pre-training
the deep neural networks which are otherwise difficult to
train. The classic U-Net architecture is an end-to-end en-
coder decoder network that has been used for biomedical
image segmentation and consists of 23 convolutional layers.
Here, our task is not image segmentation but the generation
of depth-map. In our case input image to the encoder is a
finger dorsal image (it can be either of the two the real one
or the generated spoof) and the decoder needs to generate
the corresponding depth-map of it. The proposed architec-
ture is depicted by Figure3. Here the first part is the encoder
Figure 3: Depth extraction network architecture
part which encodes the input image into features extracted
at multiple levels by applying operation like convolution.
The second part of the depth extraction network is the de-
coder part which consists of upsampling and concatenation
followed by regular convolution operation. The spatial in-
formation in the encoder has been passed on to the decoder
part along with the incoming up-sampled features that en-
ables it to generate more location precise depth information.
3.1.1 Network design and architecture
The proposed depth extraction network has been trained
specifically for depth extraction. It mainly consists of two
parts Encoder(E) and Decoder(D) which are described in
more detail in the following section.
Encoder(E) The objective function of the encoder net-
work (E) is to map the input finger dorsal image say X to a
latent representation say L as:
L = φ(WX) (1)
Here, W are the encoding weights and φ is the non-linearity.
It is the case when only one hidden layer is used. In reality
like in our case as shown in Figure3 we have used stacked
encoder consisting of many hidden units that enables it to
learn finer granular level details. In such cases latent repre-
sentation is written as:
L = φ(Wl ~ (−−−φ(W2 ~ (φ(W1 ~X))))) (2)
Here, we have considered l hidden units and Wl is the en-
coding weight corresponding to lth unit, ~ stands for con-
volution operator. During the designing of the encoder part
we have used 7 convolution layers with ReLU as an activa-
tion function. One of the reason of using ReLU is that it
avoids and rectifies vanishing gradient problem. In the first
convolutional layer we have used 5 ∗ 5 filter in order to ag-
gregate global information later on we want more precise
depth information locally hence, we have used 3 ∗ 3 filter in
all subsequent convolutional layers. More details about the
number of filters used in each layer is shown in Table 2.
Encoder Decoder
Layer Kernel
size
No of
filters
Layer Kernel
size
No of
filters
Conv1 5*5 32 D conv1 3*3 256
Conv2 3*3 64 D conv2 3*3 256
Conv3 3*3 64 Cat1 - -
Conv4 3*3 128 D conv3 3*3 128
Conv5 3*3 128 D conv4 3*3 128
Conv6 3*3 256 Cat2 - -
Conv7 3*3 256 D conv5 3*3 64
- - - D conv6 3*3 64
- - - Cat3 - -
- - - D conv7 3*3 32
- - - D conv8 3*3 32
- - - Cat4 - -
- - - D conv9 3*3 1
Table 2: Depth extraction network details
Decoder(D) Here, the objective function of the decoder
network (D) is to map the latent-representation to the corre-
sponding depth-map which can be represented as:
Xdepth map = Uφ(WX) (3)
Here, U = W> these are the decoding weights. In gen-
eral decoder with multiple hidden units is mathematically
abbreviated as:
Xdepth map = φ(Ul~ (−−−φ(U2~ (φ(U1~X))))) (4)
Here, we have considered l hidden units and Ul is the de-
coding weight corresponding to lth unit. In traditional re-
generation work often symmetric-encoder decoder structure
is used but here our task is not to regenerate the same input
but to generate the corresponding depth-map. Hence, exper-
imentally we have found that asymmetric structure works
best in our case.
3.1.2 Network training
In our collected dataset we have only 196 real images and
training a U-Net based architecture on such small dataset is
not possible. In order to overcome this problem we have
taken the advantage of transfer-learning paradigm. We have
first trained our depth extraction network on [24] dataset
consisting of 2284 images and then fine-tuned it on our
dataset using only 196 images. For training our depth ex-
traction network we have used the depth-map generated
corresponding to the images that we have collected using
Lytro-camera. Here we have used Lytro-camera because it
captures depth-information more accurately than the tradi-
tional camera. We have used it only for training purpose,
for testing purpose we have not used it because it is too ex-
pensive to be deployed in real-world applications.
Loss function : The loss function for this network is
mean square error which is written as :
MSE = 1/n
n∑
i=1
(Yi − Yˆi)2 (5)
Here, Yi is the ground truth depth-map of image i and Yˆi is
the predicted depth-map of image i and n is the total number
of images under consideration. Although this loss is sensi-
tive to outliers, but it gives a more stable and closed form
solution (by setting its derivative to 0).
Network justification : A U-Net based architecture
helps in retaining high level semantic information while
maintaining low-level details as well. The basic intuition
behind its architecture is that copying low-level intrinsic
features to the corresponding high-level features actually
facilitates backward propagation as well as it also creates
a path for information dissemination that allows signals to
propagate between low and high levels in a better and easy
manner and thus helps in generating more accurate depth-
maps. Moreover, the skip connections present in our net-
work helps in back propagating the gradients to bottom
layers and disseminate image information to the top lay-
ers. These two prominent characteristics helps in end-to-
end mapping of input image to the corresponding depth-
map. One can easily visualize this by the depth-maps gen-
erated by different types of attacks in Figure 2.
3.2. CNN based classification network
Once the depth-map is generated the next task is to dif-
ferentiate between the depth-map of a real-finger dorsal im-
age and the fake one. For this task we have taken the ad-
vantage of CNN based classifiers. In our task we have
used state-of-the-art VGG-19 [25] architecture trained on
ImageNet[20] dataset. Here, we have taken the benefit of
transfer learning paradigm and fine-tuned VGG network for
our dataset . We basically try to exploit what has been
learned in one task to improve generalization in another.
One of the main reason of using this paradigm is that we
donot have much data to train our own CNN based network
from scratch and this technique helps us to leverage the la-
belled data of the task it was initially trained on. Another
reason of using this architecture is that it is one of the most
validated network on various benchmark datasets. Tradi-
tional VGG-19 architecture have in total 22 layers out of
which there are 16 Conv layers, 5 pooling layers with no
associated weight and 1 input layer. While tweaking this
architecture for our task we have freezed all the Conv lay-
ers except the last Conv layer and added 2 dense layers. We
have experimentally decided the best architecture for our
problem. Moreover, we have also added two dense layers
in-order to avoid any kind of over-fitting in our network.
Network implementation details: Both the proposed
depth-extraction network as well as classification network
has been implemented using python and Keras [4] library
using tensorflow [14] as the back-end. All the implemen-
tations has been done on Intel(R) Xenon(R) CPU E5-2630
with 32 GB RAM and NVIDIA Tesla K40C GPU card with
on card RAM is 12GB.
4. Performance analysis
This section presents the description of in-house
database, testing strategy, and performance matrices for the
evaluation of finger dorsal spoofing detection system.
4.1. Data acquisition set-up and image description
To best of our knowledge, there is no finger dorsal
database available in public domain which is collected by a
light field camera. In this study, we made efforts to capture
light field photographs of real finger dorsals with a Lytro
camera and named this dataset as Lytro Finger Dorsal
(LFD) dataset. All images were taken in the indoor lighting
condition. The background was beige colored with wooden
texture. The distance between the camera-lens and the sub-
ject hand was kept around 60 cm. We have collected a total
of 196 real images from 33 subjects in our experimentation
work. In addition to develop spoof finger dorsal images, we
have created 196 samples corresponding to different presen-
tation attacks like mobile, printed, wrapped, and scan. Thus
in total, we get 980 images out of which 196 are real and
remaining as spoof.
4.2. Performance matrices and testing protocol
To evaluate the performance of our proposed method on
in-house LFD database, the standard matching criteria fol-
lowed by most of the existing works in literature [21] is
used. For experimentation, database is mainly categorized
into two groups: training and testing sets. Each set com-
prises of 50% of the total images. In the proposed finger
dorsal spoof detection following measures are used:
• False acceptance rate (FAR): the proportion of spoof
images which are classified as real
FAR =
FP
FP + TN
(6)
where FP and TN stands for false positive and true neg-
ative respectively.
• False rejection rate (FRR): the proportion of real im-
ages which are classified as spoof.
FRR =
FN
TP + FN
(7)
where FN and TP stands for false negative and true
positive respectively.
• Total error rate (TER): summation of FAR and FRR.
TER = FAR+ FRR (8)
• Half total error rate (HTER): half of TER.
HTER =
TER
2
(9)
• Correct recognition rate (CRR): the ratio of cor-
rectly classified test images upon the total number of
test images.
CRR =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(10)
4.3. Experiments and discussions
We examine the classification performance in accor-
dance with the generated depth maps and types of spoofing
attacks. For this, we have fine tuned the pre-trained VGG
network on our finger dorsal dataset consisting of 980 im-
ages, with different hyper parameter settings. In order to
avoid the over-fitting in the network, data augmentation has
been performed during training. The two type of experi-
ments are given below:
Two class Classification : In first experiment, the task
is to classify the finger dorsal image into discrete outcomes
or classify the image into either a group of real or fake fin-
ger dorsal image. It is also named as binary classification
or one-vs-one (ovo). The dataset was divided into indepen-
dent training and testing sets, as discussed above. This ap-
proach gets to a CRR for real and fake images as 82.65%
and 96.93% respectively. In order to perform fine-tuning,
Mode TER HTER CRR
Two class classification
Real NA NA 82.65
Spoof 0.777 0.3888 96.93
Multi-class classification
Real NA NA 96.86
Mobile attack 0 0 98.97
Print attack 0.061 0.030 40.81
Wrapped print attack 0.030 0.015 74.48
Scan attack 0.142 0.071 84.69
Table 3: Performance analysis
we have freezed 16 Conv layers of the VGG19 model, and
trained only the last Conv layer along with two dense lay-
ers after 50 epochs. Learning rate was kept 0.0001 and
SGD optimizer was used. The results with these hyper-
parameter setting are presented in Table 3 which clarifies
that our approach is performing quite well for detecting
spoof prints while the performance on real images is not
obtained so good. Although, we can easily improve the re-
sults by tweaking the hyper-parameters of CNN n/w but our
main focus is to get high performance for spoof detection.
The CMC plot for two class classification is shown in Fig-
ure 4.
Figure 4: Two Class Classification performance
Multi-class Classification : The task of classifying in-
stances into one of three or more classes is called as multi
class classification. It is also named as one-vs-all (ova). In
this experiment, unlike two class classification, our aim is
not only to classify into real or spoof images but also to
identify the type of spoof-attack. All the results for multi-
class classification are listed in Table 3. From this, it can
be observed that the obtained results for print attacks and
wrapped print attack are not so good. This is mainly be-
cause the depth map generated for these two classes on
Figure 5: Multi Class Classification performance
most of the images are quite similar. Due to this, they fall
with in each other class frequently and thus results in poor
performance. On the other side we have achieved outra-
geous results on mobile attack due to the dissimilarity in
the depth-feature information. This approach gets to a CRR
of 98.97% after 200 epochs. With this it justifies the impor-
tance of this work as in this digital era spoof attacks are of
prime concern for biometric based authentication systems.
We have also tested our network on real images captured
through normal camera and got similar results. Thus, this
experimentation eliminates the need of lytro camera dur-
ing testing for real world deployment. We only need it for
training our network. The CMC plot for multi class classi-
fication is shown in Figure 5.
5. Conclusion and future directions
In this paper, a CNN based spoof detection system for
finger dorsal images is suggested, just for the case study
purpose. In particular, we have extracted the depth fea-
ture maps of light field finger dorsal images and exam-
ined the classification performance for four different type
of presentation attacks. In future, we would make efforts
to enhance the same in-house dataset for more individuals
so as to train the proposed CNN classification model from
scratch which will be exclusively trained particularly for de-
tecting spoof from real ones. Additionally, we would like
to test our approach on other biometric traits like face and
ear, which have self tendency of depth information. Also,
we would consider the same problem on more challenging
video based print attacks.
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